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To Promote the Progress: Incentives, Exclusives, and Values to
Build a More Perfect Creative Culture
JoN M. GARON*
ABSTRACT
Significant academic and judicial focus has emphasized the copyright
and patent clause to the Constitution as reward and incentive. Much of this
analysis, however, highlights a utilitarian focus on efficiency rather than
either the Framers' philosophy or a relationship to actual market conditions
and incentives. Authorship today reflects competition between traditionally
incentive-funded content and free content as moderated on Napster,
YouTube, Wikipedia, Facebook, Massive Open Online Courses
("MOOCs"), and open source software sites.
The growth of both commercial and non-commercial creativity suggests
that utility and efficiency models are largely inaccurate. Instead, other
incentives regarding attribution, expressional interests, and paternity may be
more promotive of creativity. Moreover, consumer behaviors and the
growing experience with open creativity platforms require a reexamination
of the assumptions underlying the statutory incentives and constitutional
limitations at the heart of copyright policy.
This article analyzes the judicial history of assumptions about
incentives and contrasts those with the economic and psychological
approach to incentives to suggest a better balance for creative culture and
the benefit of society.
"The common law secures to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others . . . . No other has the
right to publish his productions in any form, without his consent."
- Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890)
Director, NKU Chase Law + Informatics Institute and Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University
Salmon P. Chase College of Law; J.D. Columbia University School of Law 1988. This article was first
presented as part of the 2013 Fred L. Carhart Memorial Program in Legal Ethics. Special thanks to Dean
Richard Bales and professors Deidr6 A. Keller and Liam O'Melinn for support with this talk and article.
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"Sometimes creativity is a compulsion, not an ambition."
- Edward Norton
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1860, Charles Selden published Selden's Condensed Ledger, which
"combines the Journal, Ledger, and Balance-Sheet, so as to present
numerous Accounts at a glance; and is peculiarly adapted to Governmental
or Corporate Company Transactions." 1 The book was created as part of a
five-monograph set in which Selden redesigned the plodding and error-
prone methods of traditional journal bookkeeping into a simple, double-
entry accounting method.2
As if anticipating the importance his work would serve on the future of
copyright law, he introduced his text as a work dedicated to promoting
progress: "[b]elieving that the useful art of [b]ook-keeping is simplified and
facilitated by my Condensed Memorandum Book and Forms of Record or
original entry, and my Condensed Ledger, they with my Forms of Report,
are cheerfully submitted to the scrutiny and patronage of all interested.,
3
Selden had tremendous hopes for his new system, but it was not to be.4
Even his meeting with Salmon P. Chase in 1965 was a full five years after
publication of the book, and a year after Chase had resigned as Secretary of
Treasury.
Selden never achieved the success that the benefits of double entry
bookkeeping suggest. 6  Instead, W.C.M. Baker won the market.7  He
published his method at a lower price and added modest variation to provide
a bit more flexibility for the user.8 While Selden had the transformative
breakthrough, it was Baker's refinements and pricing that commanded the
market. 9 Selden died deeply in debt. 0 In order to recover from Selden's
I. CHARLES SELDEN, SELDEN'S CONDENSED LEDGER AND CONDENSED MEMORANDUM BOOK;




4. Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between
Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2005).
5. See SELDEN supra note 1; Samuelson, supra note 4, at 159 (citing I THE SALMON P. CHASE
PAPERS 356 (John Niven ed., 1993)).
6. Samuelson, supra note 4, at 160.
7. Id. at 161.
8. Id. at 161-62.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 162.
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indebtedness, his widow brought legal action against Baker for copyright
infringement, successfully establishing his copying and convincing the trial
court of the infringement. 1
Legal success did not last for Mrs. Selden. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Selden's copyright in his book did not grant him a
monopoly over the method.12
Where the truths of a science or the methods of an art are the
common property of the whole world, any author has the right to
express the one, or explain and use the other, in his own way. As
an author, Selden explained the system in a particular way. It may
be conceded that Baker makes and uses account-books arranged on
substantially the same system; but the proof fails to show that he
has violated the copyright of Selden's book, regarding the latter
merely as an explanatory work; or that he has infringed Selden's
right in any way, unless the latter became entitled to an exclusive
right in the system.13
Selden himself had anticipated this when he recognized that his method
improved the useful art of bookkeeping.14  This seminal Supreme Court
decision on the scope of the Copyright Act, now statutorily embodied in
section 102(b) of the current act, emphasizes the balance between the
copyrightable expression and the public idea which is developed thereby.'
5
Baker v. Selden' 6 established the foundational limit on copyright by
making it clear that copyright did not extend to the ideas, facts, or methods
described in the author's works.' 7  The limitation on copyright remains
essential to separate the powerful negative right of patent with the more
limited right in copyright. 18 "The very object of publishing a book on
science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful
knowledge which it contains."' 9 The public received the benefit of the book
11. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1879) ("A decree was rendered for the complainant, and
the defendant appealed.").
12. Id. at 107.
13. Id. at 100-01
14. See id. at 103.
15. See id. at 100-01; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
16. Baker, 101 U.S. 99.
17. See Dale P. Olson, The Uneasy Legacy of Baker v. Selden, 43 S.D. L. REV. 604, 607 (1998)
("Baker carried forward a legacy which provided a universal point of demarcation for separating
unprotectable ideas and protectable expression.").
18. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no
exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea-not the idea
itself.").
19. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
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upon its publication and the author cannot make claim on the ideas or use to
which that work is put.
20
The world of nineteenth century publishing that Baker v. Selden
highlighted may help reorient the modem discussion regarding the
appropriate role and scope of copyright jurisprudence involving incentives
to create new works. Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century,
however, theories of law and economics sought to predict the optimal
incentives for creative output and suggest judicial interpretations of the law
to comport with these theoretical models. 2' Those models hardly predicted
22what was to come. 2 The theories of the twentieth century have given way
to an era defined by free creative content as moderated on YouTube,
Wikipedia, Facebook, Pinterest, and open source software sites. 23  Non-
commercial alternatives to creative output suggest that the assumptions
about incentives and rewards may have been wrong.24 Other incentives
regarding attribution, integrity, expressional interests, and paternity may
promote creativity more than the exclusive rights emphasized in the 1976
Copyright Act.25
This article reviews the history of copyright to identify the historical
basis for the copyright incentive.26 Then it turns to modem economic and
psychological theories of incentive to determine whether there is an optimal
balance for copyright that requires legislative action or judicial
interpretation.27
20. See Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 2 Brown's Parl. Cases 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837; 4 Burr. 2408,
98 Eng. Rep. 257; 17 Cobbett's Parl. Hist. 953 (1813) (Lord Camden) ("Knowledge has no value or use
for the solitary owner: to be enjoyed it must be communicated.").
21. See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1151, 1151-52 (2007).
22. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Len Glickman & Jessica Fingerhut, User-Generated Content: Recent Developments
in Canada and the United States, 30 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3 (2012).
UGC exists in a variety of forms, including blogs; micro-blogs (such as those uploaded to
Twitter); user reviews (such as product reviews made on Amazon.com); content uploaded to
social networking sites (such as Facebook, Linkedln, and Google+); photographs and videos
uploaded to file-sharing sites (such as Flickr, Snapfish, and YouTube); information uploaded
to wikis (such as Wikipedia and Wetpaint); content uploaded to virtual world websites (such
as Second Life); and images and videos "pinned" to content-sharing sites (such as Pinterest).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
24. See Cohen, supra note 21, at 1203-05.
25. See id.
26. See infra Part 11-111.
27. See infra Part IV-VIII.
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II. THE SILENCE SURROUNDING COPYRIGHT FEDERALISM
The Constitution provides the federal government power to grant
copyright and patent rights. 28 Relatively little was written about the ideas
that those who promoted copyright at the dawn of the United States of
America held.29 "Many early colonial copyright statutes, patterned after the
Statute of Anne, also stated that copyright's objective was to encourage
authors to produce new works and thereby improve learning.,
30
The Constitutional Convention has no recorded debate on the subject
31and the Federalist Papers contain only one reference to the power.
Professor Justin Hughes provides an extended review of the variations on
the language for federal power over copyright and patent, but how the
Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union 32 used the history will
forever be shrouded in conjecture.33  Bruce Bugbee describes
correspondence between Joel Barlow and Elias Boudinot, president of
Congress and member of the New Jersey delegation, respectively.34 Among
the correspondence is Barlow's statement urging Congress to take up
copyright legislation.35 Barlow wrote "'[t]here is certainly no kind of
property, in the nature of things, so much his own, as the works which a
person originates from his own creative imagination .... The interest in
securing to the author the output of his creativity was essential to the new
nation.
37
Nonetheless, the framers were not drafting on a clean slate.38 As early
as 1873, Connecticut and Massachusetts had enacted a state copyright
statute.39  The preamble of that act may be quite enlightening as to the
purpose by which copyright was understood:
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
29. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 901 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: of Piracy,
Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1000 (2006); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares
What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical
Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 977-78 (2007); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39 (2001).
32. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XII, para. 2.
33. Hughes, supra note 31, at 1008-09.
34. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 111 (1967).
35. Id
36. Id. (quoting Joel Barlow in NATIONAL ARCHIVES, PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
No. 78, IV folios 69-373).
37. Seeid.
38. Seeid.atl08-11.
39. BUGBEE, supra note 34, at 108-11.
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"Whereas the improvement of knowledge, the progress of
civilization, the public weal of the community, and the
advancement of human happiness, greatly depend on the efforts of
learned and ingenious persons in the various arts and sciences: As
the principal encouragement such persons can have to make great
and beneficial exertions of this nature must exist in the legal
security of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and
as such security is one of the natural rights of all men, there being
no property more peculiarly a man's own than that which is
produced by the labor of his mind: therefore, to encourage learned
and ingenious persons to write useful books for the benefit of
mankind, Be it enacted,....
In the jurisprudence of Massachusetts, both the understanding that
copyright was based on natural rights and the fact that copyright was a
property right were expressly granted.4' Connecticut law featured a similar
sentiment: "'every author should be secured in receiving the profits that
may arise from the sale of his works; and such security may encourage men
of learning and genius to publish their writings, which may do honor to their
country and service to mankind."'' 42 James Madison wrote the resolution
before the Congress of 1783, operating under the Articles of Confederation,
recommending that states enact copyright laws.43 All but one state had done
so prior to the ratification of the Constitution, so perhaps it is not surprising
that there was little need for discussion or debate as to the scope of a right
under the Constitution when the Articles of Confederation had already
enacted that right .44
This history provides a context for Madison's only reference in the
Federalist Papers.
A power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries." The utility of
this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
40. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 77 (1847) (quoting I
Mass. Laws 94 (1801)).
41. See I MASS. ACTS 94.
42. CURTIS, supra note 40, at 78 n.1 (quoting 8 Peters S.C.R. 683).
43. Id.
44. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal
reason to belong to the inventors.45
The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of
individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provisions
for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the
46decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
Madison, it seems, is building on his earlier legislation of copyright
among the states to make the extended case for patent rights.47 The negative
implication of his recognition that copyright was a common law right in
Great Britain reminds the readers that such rights were extended by the acts
of the States throughout the United States.48
The silence in the constitutional debate and the single paragraph
extolling copyright in the new Constitution were built upon states' laws that
acknowledged natural rights, property rights, and a vesting of exclusive
rights in an author's writings to promote publication, and; therefore, benefit
the greater society.49
The first federal copyright statute built upon this tradition under the
name "An Act for the encouragement of learning . . . . 60 The authors
crafting the U.S. copyright fully understood natural rights as well as
economic interests. 51 However, the balance and debate over the length and
purpose of copyright was not possible to settle.52 An 1848 treatise on U.S.
and British copyright law describes the term of copyright "as a
compromise., 53 The exclusive right in copyright will not apply "any farther
than [society] finds such a course beneficial to its own interests, in the
broadest sense of the term.",
54
45. THE FEDERALIST N. 43 (James Madison).
46. Id.
47. See BUGBEE, supra note 34, at 130-31.
48. Whether this formulation treated the right to an unpublished work as a common law natural
right, a property right in one's manuscript, or a privacy right in one's correspondence and papers is not
addressed, since all such laws focused on the exclusive statutory rights vesting upon publication.
Compare Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 591 (1834) ("That an author at common law has a property in
his manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or by obtaining a copy
endeavours to realize a profit by its publication, cannot be doubted; but this is a very different right from
that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the
author shall have published it to the world."), with Donaldson, supra note 20 (holding that Statute of
Anne divested common law right of author was divested upon publication); Hinton v. Donaldson, I
Hailes Dec. 535 (Sess. Cas. 1773) (Scotland recognized no copyright except by statute).
49. See supra notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
50. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
51. See CURTIS, supra note 40, at 77-78.
52. See id. at 23.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 77-78.
2014]
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The view that copyright was a balance found its historical roots in many
sources, including the position of Lord Mansfield, one of Britain's most
influential jurists on copyright.55
'[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally
prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their
time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their
just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other,
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts be retarded.'
56
The particular balance has been debated, and will continue to be
debated.57 The ongoing discussion, however, highlights the constant
balancing and counterbalancing between these two societal goals rather than
any suggestion that there was an historical presumption that this balance had
been established immutably for all time.
58
United States courts have also debated the scope of the purpose
underlying copyright throughout its jurisprudential history.59 In the historic
decision of Folsom v. Marsh,60  the foundation of fair use61 the
correspondence of George Washington became the subject of a copyright
A perpetuity in literary property involves some inconveniences, which may come to be
serious; one of which is, that the text of an author, after two or three generations.., belongs
to so many [descendants], that disputes must arise as to the right to publish, which are very
likely to prevent publication altogether.
Id. at 24.
55. Glynn S. Lunney, Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV.
483, 485 n.2 (1996) (quoting Cary v. Longmen, 1 East 361 n.b, 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.b (K.B. 1801)).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Liam Seamus O'Melinn, Software and Shovels. How the Intellectual Property
Revolution is Undermining Traditional Concepts of Property, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 143, 152 (2007)
("History cannot easily be pressed into the service of the intellectual property revolution. The supporters
of the revolution stand on the ground of individual entitlement, but they will not find its roots in the past.
The origins of copyright disclose that it was supremely public in nature at its inception."); Richard A.
Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1, 20-21 (2005) ("[T]he case for treating copyright and other forms of intellectual property under the
natural rights framework is more attractive than this brief account suggests.... Does a person own his
own labor, and what happens when that labor is mixed with resources that are owned in common?").
58. See, e.g., Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 894 (upholding Congressional authority for copyright
protection of works in the public domain); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192-94 (2003) (upholding
the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in both its prospective and retrospective application).
59. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
60. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1841).
61. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) ("[T]he fair
use doctrine has always precluded a use that 'supersede[s] the use of the original."' (quoting Folsom, 9
F. Cas. at 344-45)).
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dispute regarding the unauthorized reproduction of his newly published
letters.62
The defendant publisher asserted a number of reasons he was free to
publish the letters.63 The list of the ineffective defenses helps understand
the judicial understanding of copyright at the time:
It is objected, in the first place, on behalf of the defendants, that the
letters of Washington are not, in the sense of the law, proper
subjects of copyright, for several reasons: (1) Because they are the
manuscripts of a deceased person, not injured by the publication
thereof; (2) because they are not literary compositions, and,
therefore, not susceptible of being literary property, nor esteemed of
value by the author; (3) because they are, in their nature and
character, either public or official letters, or private letters of
business; and (4) because they were designed by the author for
public use, and not for copyright, or private property.64
The suggestion that copyright is entirely a personal, inchoate right
incapable of surviving the death of the rights holder would make copyright
a personal interest like a person's right to be free of defamation or invasions
of privacy. 65 This was never the construction of the property right inherent
in authorship and the court quickly rejected it.66 "The general property, and
the general rights incident to property, belong to the writer, whether the
letters are literary compositions, or familiar letters, or details of facts, or
letters of business. 67 While recognizing some inconsistency in copyright
texts on the issue of letters, the court cites a long history of protecting
private letters, regardless of the reason under which the letters were initially
penned.68 It also rejects any constitutional infirmity in copyrighting the
public letters of governmental officials or waiver of copyright because of
Washington's public life.
69




66. See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345.
67. Id. at 346.
68. Id. at 346-47 (discussing possible contrary authority and rejecting it as "a great
discouragement" of the collection and preservation of historical materials).
69. Id. at 347. Congress can waive copyright in governmental works and has chosen to do so.
See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (noting that strong public policy and constitutional grounds exist for
precluding copyright in laws and statutes, but the same basis does not necessarily extend to the
correspondence of officials).
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Rather than reject the ability of the letters to be copyrighted, the
decision crafts a careful balancing test between the copyright owner's
interest in the work, and others' interest in copying from that work.70 "In
short, we must... look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the
quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use
may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of
the original work., 71  This formulation served as the common law of
copyright until finally codified in the 1976 Copyright Act.72 Having
formulated what is now the fair use doctrine, the court applied this
balancing test to find that the taking was excessive, resulting in "an invasion
of the plaintiffs copyright., 73  "[T]he work of the defendants is mainly
founded upon these letters, constituting more than one third of their work,
and imparting to it its greatest, nay, its essential value. 74
The Supreme Court continued in this vein when it upheld the
copyrightability of a mere circus poster, despite the lack of an independent
economic need to incentivize the publication of advertisements.75 The
Court also dismissed the notion that copyright only protected worthy works,
holding that works depicting a populist pastime, like the circus, were also
protected.76
Judicial decisions throughout much of the twentieth century continued
along this same path. In Mazer v. Stein,77 the Supreme Court explained that
the benefit of copyright is the encouragement of creating new works, so that
the public can benefit from those works.78  "The economic philosophy
behind . . . copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors . . . . Sacrificial days devoted to such
70. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
71. Id.
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552.
73. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 349.
74. Id.
75. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
76. Id. at251.
A picture is none the less a picture, and none the less a subject of copyright, that it is used for
an advertisement. And if pictures may be used to advertise soap, or the theatre, or monthly
magazines, as they are, they may be used to advertise a circus. Of course, the ballet is as
legitimate a subject for illustration as any other. A rule cannot be laid down that would
excommunicate the paintings of Degas.
Id.
77. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
78. Id. at219.
[Vol. 40
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creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services
rendered.,
79
III. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT IS THE EXPRESSION
The public benefit identified in Mazer v. Stein is the creation of the
works, which redound to the benefit of the public.80  There is no discussion
of the work's eventual demise when it falls into the public domain as a
necessary, rather than added, benefit.8 1 This conception that the public
benefits from the creation of the work and the exposure of the ideas that
work disclosed harkens back to Folsom v. Marsh, and the public benefit
provided by double-entry bookkeeping. 82 The societal goal is to foster what
became known in another setting as the marketplace of ideas. 83 The market
grows because new voices add new ideas through their expression. 84  It is
peripatetic and may be wildly inefficient, but each market participant bears
the risk. 85
79. Id
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration. However, it is intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to
authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; to afford greater encouragement
to the production of literary (or artistic) works of lasting benefit to the world.
Id (internal quotes and citations omitted).
80. See id. at 219.
81. See Bere Convention Implementation Act of 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 7 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1037 ("By giving authors an incentive to create, the public benefits in
two ways: when the original expression is created and second when the limited term of protection
expires and the creation is added to the public domain.").
82. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345-46.
83. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, dissenting).
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id.
84. See id.
85. Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace ofIdeas, 2004 SUp. CT. REV. 1, 13 (2004).
Perhaps the imagery that we should take from Holmes's figure of speech is not that of a
highly structured price-determining market such as a stock exchange, a mechanism designed
to achieve plebiscitary and transactional precision, but rather a choice-proliferating
marketplace, a site for spontaneous and promiscuous browsing, comparing, tasting, and
wishing, a paean to peripatetic subjectivity amid abundance.
Id. at 14.
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The essential balance of copyright and free speech rests on this
accommodation of ideas and expression. 6  Copyright creates no prior
restraint or limitation on free speech because in such restraints "the
Government is not asserting an interest in the particular form of words
chosen in the documents, but is seeking to suppress the ideas expressed
therein., 87 Facts, formulas, processes, and algorithms receive no copyright
protection.88 "And the copyright laws, of course, protect only the form of
expression and not the ideas expressed., 89  Copyrighted works create the
market and the competition flows from the ideas expressed therein.90
"[C]opyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression.' 91
The language of the Court reinforced the suggestion that a copyrighted
work achieves public benefit through its publication rather than its eventual
demise into the public domain.92 "The sole interest of the United States and
the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors. 93 The Supreme Court
further analogizes to the patent right, saying "[a] copyright, like a patent, is
'at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the
genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and the incentive to further
efforts for the same important objects.'
94
86. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
87. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 n.* (1971).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."); Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) ("Originality remains the sine qua non of
copyright .... Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not the precise words
used to present them."); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of
Works ofInformation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1868 (1990) ("Thus, in principle, no matter how much
original authorship the work displays, the facts and ideas it exposes are free for the taking; the copyright
may cover only the facts and ideas as they are presented by the author.").
89. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726 n.*.
90. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
91. Id.; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1983) rev'd,
471 U.S. 539 (1985) ("The [Copyright] Act is thus able to protect authors without impeding the public's
access to that information which gives meaning to our society's highly valued freedom of expression.");
see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967 (1990) ("Commentary on the
public domain has tended to portray it either as the public's toll for conferring private property rights in
works of authorship or as the realm of material undeserving of property rights.").
92. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888.
93. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an 'author's'creative labor.").
94. Fox Film Corp., 286 U.S. at 127-28 (quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 328 (1858)).
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This is not to suggest that the public domain does not play an important
social function.95 The public domain is comprised of far more than merely
those works for which copyright has expired,96 and it continues to expand in
importance with the growth of Internet repositories of human expression.97
Professor Jessica Litman suggests that scones 6 faire and other notions of
originality are embodied in the broader conceptualization of the public
domain.98 Access to public domain materials also serves as the creative
toolbox for new authors and artists seeking to transform works endemic to
society and culture, or looking to find cost-effective materials for low-cost,
low-margin creative works. 99
Until the law started looking to values of utilitarianism and efficiency,
there was no need to find such practice in copyright. 00 Through a
utilitarian lens,' 0' however, liability rules, 10 2  property rules, 10 3  and
95. The importance of the public domain does not, however, change copyright's constitutional
character. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 891 ("[N]othing in the historical record, congressional practice, or
our own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First Amendment solicitude for copyrighted works that were
once in the public domain."); Liam Seamus O'Melinn, The Recording Industry v. James Madison, aka
"Publius": The Inversion of Culture and Copyright, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, 79 (2011) ("[Plublic
domain has an equivocal status, and that to the American legal mind, the public domain stands a distant
second to the private domain of copyright.").
96. See Litman, supra note 91, at 1018-23 (the public domain provides a crucial service "by
reserving the raw material of authorship to the commons, thus leaving that raw material available for
other authors to use. The public domain thus permits the law of copyright to avoid a confrontation with
the poverty of some of the assumptions on which it is based").
97. Randal C. Picker, Access and the Public Domain, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1183, 1194-95
(2012).
98. See Litman, supra note 91, at 1018.
99. See id. at 1019 ("[T]o the extent that the idea of originality embodies things that we would
like to believe, the presence of the public domain has made it possible for us to do so.").
100. See generally Darren Bush, The "Marketplace of Ideas ": Is Judge Posner Chasing Don
Quixote's Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1107-12 (2000).
101. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 100, at 1107 ("Economics has permeated a variety of disciplines,
including family and consumer studies, psychology, and law.").
102. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Rehabilitating Bentham's Theory ofExcuses, 42 TEx. TECH L.
REV. 383, 384 (2009) ("Jeremy Bentham argues that excuses follow logically from the principle of
frugality in punishment. The frugality principle holds that punishment, which entails the deliberate
infliction of pain on fellow creatures, is always an evil and can only be justified by countervailing
benefits."); Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts. An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 738 (2006) ("Risk is a real cost, in the sense of disutility, to anyone who is risk
averse."); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (1996).
103. See, e.g., Derek Fincham, The Distinctiveness of Property and Heritage, 115 PENN ST. L.
REV. 641, 645 (2011) ("There are a number of justifications for property rights, including legal
recognition of 'labor, its cousin first possession, individual self-definition and autonomy, stewardship,
divine right, utility, collective good, need, and power."' (quoting Vincent Chiappetta, The (Practical)
Meaning of Property, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 297, 303-04 (2009))); David V. DeRosa, Note, Intestate
Succession and the Laughing Heir: Who Do We Want to Get the Last Laugh?, 12 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J.
153, 187 (1997) (Bentham "wanted to insure that all property not used for a public purpose return to the
private sector as soon as possible. Bentham justified this policy position by stating, 'the government is
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monopoly rules, 10 4 all can be reinterpreted, making copyright a prime target
for analysis under a law and economics approach.'0 5
The courts generally continued to respect the role of copyright in
fostering creativity; however, there was a shift in emphasis toward the
utilitarian aspects of copyrights coinciding with the conceptual growth of
"law and economics" as an approach to the law's role in society. 10 6  The
shift in focus developed through the sixties and seventies, as Professor (and
now Associate Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer exemplified in his
1970 work, The Uneasy Case for Copyright. A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs.'0 7 Professor Breyer's work captures
the essence of the utilitarian approach.'0 8
What may lie at the root of this intuition [that copyright is property]
is a notion that property rights are often created for reasons of
efficiency .... Such a justification supports copyright protection,
however, only if copyright is a more efficient way than other
feasible institutional arrangements to satisfy the human want for
writings.l19
The academic approach began to influence opinions of the Court." 0
incapable of managing specific property to advantage."' (internal citations omitted)); J.E. Penner, The
"Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 747 (1996) ("[E]ither the right to
abandon a thing, or the right to license others to use a thing, can be elaborated to show that the right to
transfer property is an inherent feature of property rights. I shall describe the abandonment route first.");
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
104. See, e.g., Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian
Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 917 (2009); Joseph Gregory Sidak, Comment,
Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 STAN. L. REV. 329 (1981) ("[T]he Supreme Court's recent acceptance
of consumer welfare as the goal of antitrust law underscores a growing judicial inclination to construe
antitrust liability rules to encourage efficient production and efficient resource allocation." (internal
citations omitted)); see RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES,
ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 393-95 (2d ed. 1981).
105. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
106. Alain Marciano, Guido Calabresi's Economic Analysis of Law, Coase and the Coase
Theorem, 32 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 110, 110 (2012) (field of law and economics that Ronald Coase and
Guido Calabresi demarcated); see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 58 (1960);
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517-18
(1961).
107. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 281 (1970) (framing the debate with the
Macaulay's quote that copyrights are "'a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers'
reveal[ing] the conflict of interest between the reader and the book producer that underlies much of the
discussion about copyright law." (internal citations omitted)); T. MACAULAY, SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT
25 (C. Gaston ed. 1914)).
108. See Breyer, supra note 107, at 289.
109. Id.
110. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
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This judicial shift may have begun in the parallel discussion of patent
law, which Graham v. John Deere Co. triggered,"' decided not long after
the Ronald Coase published his seminal work on social cost." 2 In Graham,
the Supreme Court interpreted the correspondence of Thomas Jefferson, and
"rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual property rights and clearly
recognized the social and economic rationale of the patent system.' 13
Here, the Court focused squarely on patent law rather than sweeping both
copyright and patent law into the discussion. 14 "The patent monopoly was
not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries.
Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge."
'" 5
The Court concluded, "[t]he grant of an exclusive right to an invention was
the creation of society-at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed
ideas-and was not to be freely given.''
16
Foundationally, authors of copyrighted works and inventors of patented
works have profoundly different exclusive grants and operate with different
incentives to create. 1 7  Yet despite this language, which could be
understood to distinguish copyright from patent in the discourse, the
reference to intellectual property rights preceding the patent discussion
opened the door to a conflation of purpose between copyright and patent
law. 118  This lack of discrimination between copyright and patent was
furthered by then-Associate Professor Richard Posner when he used
copyrights and patents as examples of price-maximizing monopolies
"highly unpopular with purchasers, government agencies, and society at
large."'19
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 106, at 1.
113. Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-9.
114. Id. at 6.
115. Id. at 9.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., O'Melinn, The Recording Industry v. James Madison, supra note 95, at 88
(describing "the weakness of the natural law position in patent law.... Evans spoke a language of
inventors' property rights very similar to the modem language of authors and ownership, while Jefferson
spoke the language of public benefit."); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1013 (1997) ("While the basic incentive structure of copyright law
is the same as patent law-a limited grant of exclusive rights to creators in order to encourage both more
creation and the dissemination of existing works-there are substantial differences between the two
doctrines."). For the economics of patent law, see Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908 (1990).
118. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 554 (1969).
119. Id. ("We know, for example, that patent and copyright holders and other monopolists
commonly practice price discrimination. As we shall soon see, discrimination is the profit-maximizing
strategy of a monopolist.").
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The 1975 decision of Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken 120
highlights the purpose of copyright and its utilitarian limitations. 12' Rather
than citing to Graham and its utilitarian analysis, the Court cites a much
earlier patent law case in support of the proposition that copyright benefits
the public by granting monopoly to its authors. 122 The Court, however,
places a limit on the copyright monopoly. 123 Copyright "reflects a balance
of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the
cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the
other arts."' 124  As law and economics grew in importance as a
jurisprudential framework, courts began to entertain notions of a utilitarian,
economically efficient copyright as if copyright's origins were the same as
those of patent rights.
125
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 126 reflects the
Court's willingness to overlap copyright and patent even further, utilizing a
statutory patent provision to develop a common law copyright doctrine for
fair use involving substantially non-infringing uses for goods sold in
commerce. 127  The Court addressed the intellectual property monopoly
explicitly for the first time:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private
benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important
public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired. 1
28
Here, the Court rejects the characterization of Mazer v. Stein and all the
Supreme Court decisions that went before it, treating the scope and
limitations of copyright and patent law as substantially identical. 29 While
120. 422 U.S. 151.




125. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
126. Id.
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the Court was correct that copyright and patent law share secondary liability
doctrines in common, such that defenses to those doctrines can
appropriately coincide, the decision to prescribe copyright with the
utilitarian purpose of patent emphasizes a utilitarian economic rationale
unwarranted by history, original intent, or precedent.'
30
Fortunately, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises'
31
and in Golan v. Holder,132 the Supreme Court returns to a more foundational.
understanding of copyright. 133 "By establishing a marketable right to the
use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create
and disseminate ideas."' 134 The problem with focusing on the economics of
copyright was not copyright effectiveness but instead the misguided effort
to make utility and efficiency the focus of the marketplace.1
35
The Supreme Court has correctly stated the relationship of copyright
incentives as secondary consideration to foster the creation of new works
for the benefit of the public. 136 The statement, however, begs the essential
question of how this relationship best operates. 37  Law and economics
theory has many adherents. 38  Believers in law and economics posit,
"[c]opyright demands tailoring, both judicially and legislatively, because of
its broad rights and even broader potential application."' 39  As discussed
earlier, however, a copyright owner has exclusive control only over his or
her own expression. 40 If the application of those rights appears broad for a
given work, it is because the public values that author's work; the rights do
not extend to the ideas or to independent creation.'
4'
The corollary of the statement that ownership interests demand tailoring
because of broad rights and broader potential application can be applied
universally to any ownership interest-real property, commercial leases,
130. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429.
131. 471 U.S. 539.
132. 132 S. Ct. 873.
133. Id. at 889-90.
134. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558; see also Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889-90.
135. See, e.g., Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope
and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REv. 187, 192-93 (2006).
136. Golan, 132 S.Ct. at 889-90.
137. Id; Samuel J. Levine, Richard Posner Meets Reb Chaim of Brisk: A Comparative Study in
the Founding ofIntellectual Legal Movements, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 95, 97 (2006).
138. Levine, supra note 138, at 96 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW xix
(2003) ("declaring that law and economics is the 'foremost interdisciplinary field of legal studies."')).
139. Sag, supra note 135, at 191.
140. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556, 558.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 102; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)
("[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian
Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they
might of course copy Keats's.").
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financial instruments, testamentary estates, or any other right that an
individual could hold and that the State could use its power to dispossess
and redistribute. 142 Copyrighted works may have a shorter lifespan than real
property or trademarks. 43  That copyright can be retailored-unlike real
property-arguably is based on the false conception that intangible property
is less "real" than tangible property.
44
The first argument assumes that "[i]n its pure form, information is a
public good, meaning that it is both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous.' 45
Nonpublic goods are those without these attributes such as property. 46
Property's attributes of physical control and the ability to exclude omit
private property from the category of public good. 47  For example,
shoreline may lose the ability to statutorily exclude and thus becomes a
public good.'
48
Copyrighted works, unlike the concept of pure information, subsist in
tangible works. "49  They have the legal right of excludability, i.e.,
possession and the right to exclude, as do other intangible property interests
such as "reversions, remainders, executory interests, powers of termination,
and possibilities of reverter .... ,,150 Real property, similarly, has these
attributes only as a matter of positive law.
When Blackstone described property as exclusive dominion . . .
[his] axiom put aside the earlier medieval traditions in which
property ownership had been hemmed in by intricate webs of
military and other obligations; it ignored the family ties
encapsulated in such devices as the entailed fee; and it ignored as
well the general neighborly responsibilities of riparian and nuisance
142. See generally Sag, supra note 135, at 191.
143. Richard E. Halperin, Vehicles for Artists'Holding and Transferring Copyrights, 22 COLUM.
VLA J.L. & ARTS 435, 450 (1998).
144. Cf. Breyer, supra note 107, at 288 ("The second claim for special consideration for authors
rests upon an intuitive, unanalyzed feeling that an author's book is his 'property.' But why do we have
such a feeling?").
145. Sag, supra note 135, at 193; see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 14 (2003).
146. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 43 (4th ed. 1992).
147. Id.
148. See e.g., Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30214(b) (West 2013).
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
150. Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy
and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1288 (2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 9 cmt. b
(1936)).
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law. Blackstone himself was thoroughly aware of these pervasive
and serious qualifications on exclusive dominion.'
51
Copyrights are not conceptually different from other forms of property
for they have all been something less than absolute. 152 This debate began
conceptually with the discourse between Thomas Hobbes and John
Locke. 153  To the extent Hobbes suggested the rights of property were
dependent on the mere whim of the government enforcing those rights,
Locke rejoined that natural law gave man a property interest in the fruits of
his labor. 54 For Locke, advancement beyond the commons created value.
"The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they
were in, hath fixed my property in them."'' 55  Hobbes advocated that all
property belonged to the State, and was within the power of the State to
redistribute. 56 Note that even Hobbes contrasted "a naturall property in
some usefull art" with "propriety in a portion of Land . . . ., suggesting
that Hobbes did not dispute the nature of labor so much as the power of God
and the sovereign to exercise authority over those natural rights. Under his
view, the natural rights of man must inevitably bow down to the power of
the sovereign, 158 which is their source and sustenance.' 59
Copyright fails the public good test for a second reason. Unlike the
commons or the sea, copyrighted works only exist to the extent that authors,
artists, and creators create the work. 60 While the creative spark essential for
copyright is axiomatic in their legal protection, the characterization of their
property rights should not be overlooked.
161
151. Crol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603
(1998).
152. See Kevin Smith, How "Real" is Intellectual Property?, DUKE UNIV. SCHOLARLY COMM.
BLOG (July 3, 2008), https://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2008/07/03/how-real-is-ip-2/.
153. See RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
WORLD OF IDEAS 19-21 (2013).
154. See id. at 17 (citing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20
(1986)).
155. LOCKE, supra note 154, at 20.
156. THOMAS HOBBES, The Laws of Transferring Property Belong Also to the Soveraign, in
LEVIATHAN 108 (1651) (Gutenberg ed., 2002).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 80 ("[B]ecause every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the Actions, and
Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any
of his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice.").
159. Id. at 55 ("God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people, he is King by
Covenant."). Earlier in the text Hobbes discusses speech and letters, noting, "[tihe first author of Speech
was GOD himselfe, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight." Id. at
Chapter IV.
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
161. Breyer, supra note 107, at 288-89 (rejecting the treatment of copyright as property, Breyer
actually discusses the nonrivalrous nature of ideas instead: "Since ideas are infinitely divisible, property
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Finally, despite the suggestion of many law and economic theorists,'
62
copyright may be only partially nonrivalrous. "A nonrivalrous resource
can't be exhausted."' 163  Yet live public performances of theatrical
productions have finite audiences and even more limited opening night
seats; only one person at a time can read a book; only those with physical
access to the work and the ability to move to the front of the queue can view
fine art; and even music can become old, stale, and out of fashion. While
the theoretical copyright that subsists in a work may indeed be immune to
exhaustion; the exploitation of the copyright typically has a declining
economic value and represents a depreciable asset.
164
David Simon suggests that "[n]onrivalrous property is property that,
when used, does not decrease the amount of property remaining."1 65 Other
authors' re-use is physically nonrivalrous, though it might affect the value
of the copied work in an economically rivalrous manner.1 66  Whether
through re-use by others or exploitation by the copyright holder, the market
for copyrights and copyrighted works often does decrease with use.
16 7
Licensees pay significant premiums for exclusive rights to copyrighted
works, highlighting the economic reality of copyright's rivalrous economic
rights are not needed to prevent congestion, interference, or strife. Nor does the fact that the book is the
author's creation seem a sufficient reason for making it his property").
162. See, e.g., Klay v. All Defendants, 425 F.3d 977, 985 (11th Cir. 2005) ("If the property is
nonrivalrous-i.e., one party's use of the property 'does not necessarily diminish the use and enjoyment
of other ... ' (quoting Ala. Power Co. v. F.C.C., 311 F.3d 1357, 1369 (1 1th Cir. 2002))); LAWRENCE
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 21 (2002);
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 145 at 14.
163. LESSIG,supra note 162, at2l.
164. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 143, at 450 ("The method generally used for the depreciation
of copyrights is the 'income forecast' method. The IRS has taken the position that this is the correct
method for depreciating television films, movie films, book manuscripts, patents and master recordings,
and copyright interests in musical compositions.") (internal citations omitted); Dana Shilling, § 4.06
TREATMENT OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, LAW'S DESK BOOK (2014) ("The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
created a new 15-year amortization provision (enacted as § 197) for certain intangibles acquired by the
taxpayer (e.g., goodwill; patents, copyrights, and designs; customer- and supplier-based intangibles;
franchises, trademarks, and trade names).").
165. David A. Simon, In Search of (Maintaining) the Truth: The Use of Copyright Law by
Religious Organizations, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 355, 388 (2010).
166. See Picker, supra note 97, at 1194 ("The fact that use of the works is nonrivalrous means that
from the perspective of creators, without more, they will capture only a fraction of the value that they
create, and much of the value will spill over to third parties.").
167. See id. ("We know that spillovers-positive externalities-are an important feature of
intellectual property works.").
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nature.168 Copyrighted books, films, and records physically erode with use,
and their value generally wanes over time. 169
Some manifestations of copyrighted works are more nonrivalrous than
others. 170  Live events and physical copies are rivalrous. 171  Broadcast
television and digital copies, in contrast, illustrate the general notions of
nonrivalrous consumption. 172 Each viewer can watch a television show or
download a song file or digital book without affecting the enjoyment by
others. 173 Even here, however, existing price discrimination models suggest
the economic theory does not properly coincide with the market reality.174
The cable broadcast of a live event can sell for a significant premium over
that same broadcast sold a day later.175  When its timeliness erodes, the
value of the broadcast economically diminishes.
Characterizing copyright as a public good is a tautological shift
suggesting that an author has taken something from the public when she
insists on enforcing the right to exclude. 176  Society should pay only the
minimal costs necessary to make the service provider whole. 177  Public
utilities, for example, should earn a regulated amount since what they
charge raises the cost for all of society. 178 This view has its roots in the
tautological approach to utility theory itself rather than to copyright. 
179
In contrast to copyright, ideas are the quintessential public good. "He
who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine receives light without
darkening me."' 80 Thomas Jefferson has famously been quoted for rejecting
the natural rights theories generally and singling out inventors.181
168. See Katie ldzik, Note, No More Drama? The Past, Present, and Potential Future of
Retroactive Transfers of Copyright Ownership, 18 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH, & INTELL. PROP. L. 127,129
(2007).
169. See Purchaser's Depreciation Rights in Property to a Lease, 82 MICH. L. REV. 572, 579
(1983).
170. See William W. Fisher et al., Copyright & Privacy-Through the Political Lens, 4 J.





175. David Bauder, Live Events Prove Increasingly Lucrative for TV Networks, ASSOC. PRESS
(Oct. 20, 2013, 7:29 AM), http://www.standard.net/stories/2013/10/I 8/live-events-prove-increasingly-
lucrative-tv-network.
176. See Shane D. Valenzi, Rereading a Canonical Copyright Case: the Nonexistent Right to




180. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, (Aug. 13, 1813), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/al 8_8s1 2.html.
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However, by ignoring the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright and
conflating these policies with patent law, a public good approach to
copyright has made efficiency the goal where it never properly existed. 82
Patent law, unlike copyright, grants a right to exclude over the independent
creation of an invention or the use of that invention.183 Consequently, for
the duration of the patent, the patent holder controls both the embodiment of
the ideas contained in the patent, and the ideas themselves.'8 4  The ideas
cannot fuel the fire for others when so constrained, and patents illustrate the
societal burden that exclusivity creates. 85 Jefferson is similarly dismissive
of claims to real property rights based on rights other than "occupation.' 86
The idea/expression dichotomy allows authors to light the lamps of
knowledge through their works without ever giving up copyright of the
expression in those works. 187  To the extent economic theories focus on
intellectual property rather than the distinct rights for authors, inventors,
owners of trademarks, and holders of trade secrets, those theories drop the
essentiality of copyright.
88
This approach is understandable given the historical emphasis of utility
theory. 89 Rather than looking back from Locke to Hobbes, it may be more
instructive to look forward to Jeremy Bentham and David Hume, who are
among the forerunners of the utilitarian economic approach. 90 Bentham
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual
instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space,
without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and
have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions
then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
Id.
181. Thomas F. Poche, Note, The Clinical Trial Exemption from Patent Infringement Judicial
Interpretation of Section 271(E)(1), 74 B.U. L. REV. 903, n. 12 (1994).
182. Valenzi, supra note 176, at 117-20.
183. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012); Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) ("A patent represents the legal right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering
to sell a patented invention in the United States, and from importing the invention into the United
States.").
184. See 35 U.S.C § 154(a)(1).
185. See Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 587, 602 (2006).
186. Jefferson, supra note 180.
187. See id.
188. See Brian A. Dahl, Comment, Originality and Creativity in Reporter Pagination: A
Contradiction in Terms?, 74 IOWA L. REV. 713 n.21 (1989).
189. See Valenzi, supra note 176, at 117-20.
190. CASS & HYLTON, supra note 153, at 20; see, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 23 (Kitchener: Batoche Books 2000) (1781) ("Among
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champions utility as the only true tautology for the State, rejecting natural
law as spurious. 191 "The corn which has gone to constitute your body
formerly grew in my field: can it be that you are not my slave?"1 92  He
further rejects any claim that there are preferences that society can make,
whether antipathies against certain actors or behaviors or sympathies to
promote certain agendas. 193  "It is this . . . principle of sympathy which
leads us to speak of an action as 'deserving' reward. Now, this word
'deserve' simply involves us in confusion and angry disputes; it is the
'effects,' good or bad, which alone we ought to consider." 194
Bentham invites a discussion of effects public policy created on various
interests, stripped of any natural law origins or moral judgments.' 95 Modern
law and economics may start with Bentham, but it does not rest there. The
second axiom is based on the efficiency thesis. "The efficiency thesis
simply says that in the absence of transaction costs and externalities, two
bargainers will achieve a Pareto efficient result."
' 96
The Coase Theorem has been described as "[p]erhaps the single greatest
intellectual event in the modern law & economics movement . . . a rare
article that has become a landmark in the disciplines of both law and
economics." 197  The theorem can be described as follows: 'When
bargaining costs are zero, the initial assignment of legal entitlements does
not affect the efficiency of the resulting allocation of resources."" 9' The
principles adverse to that of utility, that which at this day seems to have most influence in matters of
government, is what may be called the principle of sympathy and antipathy.").
191. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 99 (Charles Milner Atkinson trans., Oxford
Press 1914).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 100.
194. Id.
195. But see James Oldham, From Blackstone to Bentham: Common Law Versus Legislation in
Eighteenth-Century Britain, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (1991).
Bentham thought the "high incidence of legislative miscarriage" avoidable, and because he
believed an all-encompassing legislative code to be feasible, its construction was imperative;
a prescriptive code built around principles of utility would be vastly more efficient and
effective than sporadic punishments meted out by common law courts against defendants
who did wrong.
Id.
196. Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783,
785 (1990).
197. Id. at 783.
198. Id. at 783 (citing R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1,
27 (1959) ("[T]he delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market transactions; but the ultimate
result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal decision.").
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Coase Theorem assumes there are no transaction costs or bargaining costs,
and it further assumes efficient allocation as the outcome. 199
Efficiency theory introduces the second tautological failing caused by
conflating ideas with expression, treating all intellectual property as public
goods, and assuming away differences among and between authors,
inventors, and other creators. 200 The assumptions begin to pile up. Ignoring
the implausibility of economic models that do without transaction costs or
bargaining costs, the Coase Theorem posits that an efficient bargain benefits
society, regardless of the values the parties to the bargain achieved.2 1
Specifically, the Coase Theorem accepts and therefore asserts Pareto
optimality as a beneficial goal.20 2 Pareto optimality represents a party-
neutral economic efficiency model.20 3
Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements
which would lead to that allocation of resources which could not be
improved.., further change would not so improve the condition of
those who gained by it that they could compensate those who lost
from it and still be better off than before.204
What this requires is that all parties accept purely economically rational
behavior. "[T]o do something that is not profit-maximizing for the
strategizer but that imposes losses on the opponent as well, such as walking
away from a profitable bargain. ... ." is outside the model.0 5
It should quickly become obvious that such an economic model is not
merely irrelevant but actually counterproductive for copyright marketplaces.
Take fine art, for example. Prices, values, and even categories are highly
volatile and controversial.0 6 Courts are reluctant to even categorize and
199. Hovenkamp, supra note 196, at 785.
200. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 118, at 554 ("[Platent and copyright holders and other
monopolists commonly practice price discrimination.").
201. Hovenkamp, supra note 196, at 875.
202. Id.
203. Id.; Herbert Hovenkamp, Bargaining in Coasian Markets: Servitudes and Alternative Land
Use Controls, 27 J. CORP. L. 519, 521 (2002) ("A market is Coasian rather than neoclassical if it
contains value that cannot be created without the cooperation of all buyers and sellers of that particular
entitlement in that market.").
204. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 103, at 1093-94.
205. Hovenkamp, supra note 196, at 790 ("But, once again, the theorem assumes both perfect
information and profit-maximizing participants.").
206. David Brancaccio, A Painting That Gets Better as Art if it Sells for $100 Million,
MARKETPLACE Bus. (Nov. 13, 2013),
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/painting-gets-better-art-if-it-sells- 100-million (David
Brancaccio's interview with art critic Blake Gopnik).
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label a particular work as an aesthetically fine artwork.2 °7 More simply put,
"judges can make fools of themselves pronouncing on aesthetic matters. 20 8
How can one achieve Pareto optimality when the parties have not even a
common conception of the definition of a work? How can the parties
bargain efficiently or create value appropriate for society? Professor
Christine Haight Farley notes that "[f]or a court to weigh in on questions of
art, or to discriminate aesthetically, would result in anointing a particular
interpretation of art above others. 20 9 It inexorably follows that for a court
to favor economic efficiency in a dispute involving art is to discriminate
against the aesthetic value of art.210
Judges know better than to use aesthetics. "It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits."'2 11 The same should be said of economics. By
diminishing the role of aesthetic value and enhancing the role of efficiency,
the Court is placing a thumb on the scales of the dispute.212 Worse, if the
utilitarian efficiency goals informing law and economic jurisprudence form
the background construct, then the decision to avoid aesthetic decision
making is an intentional limitation on the court, and judges may not even
discern the bias embedded in their analysis.213
Another example flows from the importance that authors and artists
place on receiving credit for their work.21 4 There is a widely recognized,
but hard to monetize, reputational value associated with attribution.
215
'The whole point of this picture is about the way we love commodities in this country, the
way America's all about high prices-objects you want to buy,' Gopnik says. 'So if I was a
billionaire buying this picture, I'd want to spend at least a hundred million bucks on it,
because that's what Damien Hirst sold his diamond studded skull for. So, it seems to me, you
want to match that magical price tag-and I might even bid myself up to $250 million, which
is what a Cezanne sold for to the royal family in Doha.'
Id. (internal links omitted).
207. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214 ("Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to
permit a narrow or rigid concept of art."); Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805,
812-13 (2005) ("Determinations about art, it is argued, are inherently subjective and therefore
particularly ill-suited for judicial resolution.").
208. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983).
209. Farley, supra note 207, at 813.
210. Seeid. at811-13.
211. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
212. See Farley, supra note 207, at 827.
213. Seeid
214. Jeannette Gunderson, Comment, An Unaccountable Familiarity: A Dual Solution to the
Problem of Theft in Theatrical Productions, 31 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 667, 696 (2008).
215. Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What's A Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value of
Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1389, 1391-92 (2013).
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Credit for one's contribution has an economic impact, predominantly on
future employment, which makes valuation even more speculative. 216 An
efficiency approach to the law would tend to ignore that. which is
speculative.1 7 Although the court may not award speculative damages, the
parties to a transaction ex ante can certainly agree to allocate value to
speculative benefits of a transaction and value the arrangement
accordingly.218  Public policy that ignores anything not efficient
systematically strips authors of their real, but speculative, rights in their
works.
219
As Professor Mark Lemley correctly suggests, rationales for copyright
protection that are inconsistent with market realities do not serve to further
discussions regarding the appropriate scope of copyright protection.220
Market realities, however, vary considerably among different copyright
industries, over time, and by perspective.221 Perhaps the best the law can do
is to strip away the rationales for copyright policy and lay bare the
distribution preferences among authors, industries built upon copyright
consumption, and the public's broader interest.
222
IV. BEYOND EFFICIENCY
Appropriate copyright policy need not reject efficiency and utilitarian
goals, but should understand these goals for the normative societal
preference they represent.
All societies have wealth distribution preferences. They are,
nonetheless, harder to talk about than are efficiency goals. For
efficiency goals can be discussed in terms of a general concept like
Pareto optimality to which exceptions - like paternalism - can be
noted. Distributional preferences, on the other hand, cannot
usefully be discussed in a single conceptual framework. There are
216. Gunderson, supra note 214, at 696 ("While receiving credit for one's work is often more a
matter of recognition than an issue about compensation, one of the main reasons that receiving that
credit is so critical is because of the importance of one's professional reputation in a performance-based
industry such as theatre.").
217. Sprigman, supra note 215, at 1393.
218. Id. at 1393.
219. Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and other Protection of Works of Information
after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 373 (1992).
220. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 135 (2004) (rejecting ex post market justifications as not reflective of the actual
markets in copyright and in other areas of intellectual property law).
221. See Alufunmilayo B. Arewa, Youtube, Ugc, and Digital Music: Competing Business and
Cultural Models in the Internet Age, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 431, 440 (2010).
222. See Valenzi, supra note 176, at 117-20.
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some fairly broadly accepted preferences - caste preferences in
one society, more rather than less equality in another society. There
are also preferences which are linked to dynamic efficiency
concepts - producers ought to be rewarded since they will cause
everyone to be better off in the end. Finally, there are a myriad of
highly individualized preferences as to who should be richer and
who poorer which need not have anything to do with either equality
or efficiency - silence lovers should be richer than noise lovers
because they are worthier.223
As the discussion of fine art suggests, many of these distribution
preferences may also suggest additional societal preference embedded in
U.S. culture but never articulated.224 The narrowly decided Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.2 25 may reflect a bias toward
consumer protection and a value decision that leaky copyright
enforcement 226 creates a healthier balance between copyright owners and
consumers than does a rigidly interpreted law.227
The decision may instead, or additionally, reflect a preference for a
more comprehensive informatics infrastructure, which limits interests of
copyright holders when contrasted with manufacturers and
telecommunications companies that serve the U.S. economy more
broadly. 228  Statutory preferences suggest this. 229  The Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act 230 provides a broad safe harbor for
Internet service providers and other content hosts from copyright 
liability.231
The Fairness in Music Licensing Act provided broad exemptions from
223. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 103, at 1098.
224. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
225. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 454.
226. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 43 (2003) ("A large, leaky market may actually provide more
revenue than a small one over which one's control is much stronger"); Pamela Samuelson, Information
as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?,
38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 369 (1989) ("[I]nformation is inherently 'leaky.' It may be shared readily by
many people through virtually limitless forms of communication. Consequently, information is very
difficult to maintain in any exclusive manner unless kept secret by its discoverer or possessor.").
227. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 454 ("'The audience benefits from the time-shifting capability have
already been discussed. It is not implausible that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters,
and advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more persons to view their broadcasts."') (quoting
Univ. City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 457 (1979))).
228. See Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 876-77 (2004).
229. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
230. Id. (enacted as part of the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
231. Id.
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copyright liability for public performances and transmissions in stores and
restaurants.232
Such distributional preferences are within the ambit of Congress to
determine.233 In Eldred and Golan, the Supreme Court deferred almost
absolutely to this congressional authority.2 34 While not suggesting that
additional distributional preferences are constitutional mandates, this article
emphasizes two important distributional preferences in understanding the
scope of existing copyright law and in crafting any future legislative
changes.
V. To PROMOTE THE PROFESSIONAL AUTHOR
The first suggested preference underlying copyright law reflects its
earliest origins in the United States and perhaps its most important role.235
The 1873 Massachusetts copyright law focused on a number of purposes
behind the law, specifically "'the efforts of learned and ingenious persons in
the various arts and sciences . ,,,236 were to be rewarded in order to
improve knowledge, promote progress of civilization, and advance human
happiness.237 The law recited that "such persons can have to make great and
beneficial exertions of this nature.,
238
The public benefit of a creative class has been identified as an engine of
economic development. 239 "'[K]nowledge' and 'information' are the tools
and materials of creativity. 'Innovation,' whether in the form of a new
technological artifact or a new business model or method, is its product., 240
The demand for knowledge to.build a nation was understood, 241 and the
economic analysis was that which informed the heart of Baker v. Selden.242
232. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2012) (providing two provisions that can be understood to
represent Congress's economic quid pro quo between copyright term length and scope).
233. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192-94; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877-78.
234. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192-94; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877-78.
235. See, e.g., 1 Mass. Acts 94.
236. CURTIS, supra note 40, at 77 (quoting I Mass. Acts 94).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND How IT'S TRANSFORMING
WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 28-30 (2004).
240. Id. at 44; see generally JASON POTTS, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 17
(2011) (intemal quotation marks omitted).
241. See STEVEN MINTZ, MORALISTS AND MODERNIZERS: AMERICA'S PRE-CIVIL WAR
REFORMERS 114-115 (1995) (discussing the lack of meaningful higher education in the new United
States. "At the end of the American Revolution, the nation had thirteen colleges." Noah Webster noted,
"[o]ur learning is superficial in shameful degree... our colleges are disgracefully destitute of books and
philosophical apparatus.").
242. Seeid. at 114-15; Baker, 101 U.S. at 103-04.
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The goal is not merely the quantity of works, but the voice of the
author.243 The philosopher Immanuel Kant believed "'[i]n a book as a
writing the author speaks to his reader."' 244 The relationship is unique and
deserves extraordinary protection.245
In Napster, the defendants claimed as much as ninety-eight percent of
the music on the system was music lawfully placed there (or at least music
not published on the plaintiff's record labels).246 Yet at least seventy
percent of the music actually available was that of the plaintiffs.247 The
public does not demand access to content; it demands access to content
created by professional artists who develop their craft, invest in their skills,
and build an audience over time.24  The professional makes a
transformative commitment; the very best deserve the rewards protected
through copyright.249
Since the public ultimately benefits most from those works that develop
the critical new ideas most effectively and those that influence the aesthetics
of their age most powerfully, the focus should be on the professional
authors who can invest the time and effort to hone their crafts and build a
powerful body of work. 5 °
The policy supporting an economic incentive to create the creative class
can be found across a number of different economic and sociological
243. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106-07 (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
244. Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059, 1076 (2008).
245. KANT, supra note 243, at 106-07.
246. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom., 239 F.3d 1004 ("Defendant claims that it engages in the authorized
promotion of independent artists, ninety-eight percent of whom are not represented by the record
company plaintiffs.")
247. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The record
supports the district court's determination that 'as much as eighty-seven percent of the files available on
Napster may be copyrighted and more than seventy percent may be owned or administered by
plaintiffs."' (quoting A & MRecords, 114 F.Supp.2d at 911)).
248. See, e.g., GILLI MOON, I AM A PROFESSIONAL ARTIST: THE KEY TO SURVIVAL AND SUCCESS
IN THE WORLD OF THE ARTS 22-23 (2nd ed. 2003) (discussing how an artist might distinguish himself
from other artists by creating a competitive advantage). There are exceptions, of course. But even the
overnight success stories are often required to work very hard to stay at the top of their craft. Id.
249. Id. at 23.
It can be quite disheartening when you come out of school being the most talented, shining
star, and realizing in the big wide professional world of the Arts that you are just a small fish
in the huge ocean of talented artists .... Going for the gold is highly competitive because
there are so many talented Artists and so little opportunity in comparison.
250. See Feder, supra note 228, at 861.
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fronts.2  In global economics, for example, there are concerns that the U.S.
economy suffers from a double "'brain drain."'' 252  The first brain drain
stems from U.S. educated graduate students leaving the United States for
their homelands. 25 3 "The booming economies and improved research and
development of countries such as China and India, along with the prospects
of living near family have led many of America's top college graduates to
return home, bringing their skills and ideas with them., 254 This trend may,
in fact, coincide with the expanded intellectual property protections in the
home countries of these U.S. educated Ph.D.s returning home.2 55
"Teaching, scholarship, and research are three of the six favored uses in the
preamble to § 107. Congress thus considered learning as one of the societal
purposes that fair use was intended to promote. 256 Promoting teaching,
scholarship, and research through incentives to create is equally consistent
with the Copyright Act.
25 7
The modern knowledge economy, anticipated in the development of the
1976 Copyright Act and revisions thereafter, 258 require what Daniel Bell
described as new knowledge.25 9 "Knowledge consists of new judgments
(research and scholarship) or new presentations of older judgments
(textbook and teaching)., 260  The knowledge of the postindustrial society
was understood to shape the economic future of the nation.26 1 "Forces of
economic and technological development are leading to . . . a society in
which the source of wealth lies not only in the production and distribution
of goods but also in the creation and dissemination of information., 262
251. Jack Hodapp, America's Two "Brain Drains," NORTHWESTERN Bus. REVIEW (Nov. 13,
2011), http://northwestembusinessreview.org/america's-two-"brain-drains"/; see also VIVEK WADHWA
ET. AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE IMMIGRATION BACKLOG, AND A REVERSE BRAIN-DRAIN:
AMERICA'S NEW IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS PART III 31 (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1008366.
252. Hodapp, supra note 251.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See generally FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGY USES
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 75-77 (1978), available at
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/-bcarver/mediawiki/images/8/89/CONTU.pdf [hereinafter CONTU];
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 324-25, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPs].
256. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2580 (2009).
257. Id.at2580-81.
258. See CONTU, supra note 255, at 3.
259. See DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL
FORECASTING 174-75 (1976); CONTU, supra note 255, at 3.
260. BELL, supra note 259, at 175.
261. See CONTU, supra note 255, at 3.
262. Id.
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Incentives to educate and retain those who are most successful creating
postindustrial wealth, jobs, and knowledge serve a fundamental societal
goal.263 That was true in Massachusetts during the founding of the nation
and remains even more potent today.264 Retaining the best and brightest
global minds as part of U.S. economic policy-including copyright,
immigration policy, and other related legislative agenda-represents an
important congressional agenda.265
This same agenda informs many nations regarding their intellectual
266property regimes. Nelson Mandela has been quoted directly on the
disparities of information.267  '"Eliminating the distinction between the
information-rich and information-poor is . . . critical to eliminating
economic and other inequalities between North and South, and to improving
the life of all humanity.', 268 Competing for leadership in a knowledge-rich
economy requires strong incentives to reward those who invest time and
effort to lead their economies.269
This need to incentivize the creative class leadership reflects the second
brain drain concern, namely a concern that other incentives are drawing
away those most capable of creating new knowledge.27° Much of this
concern has focused on the lure of top-paying jobs in the financial services
sector, rather than jobs in education or creative industries. 271 "[T]he country
263. See Hodapp, supra note 251.
264. See MINTZ, supra note 241, at 114; Hodapp, supra note 251.
265. See Hodapp, supra note 251.
266. See Douglas L. Rogers, Increasing Access to Knowledge Through Fair Use-Analyzing the
Google Litigation to Unleash Developing Countries, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2-3 (2007).
267. ERNST J. WILSON, Il, THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1
(2004).
268. Douglas L. Rogers, Increasing Access to Knowledge through Fair Use:Analyzing the Google
Litigation to Unleash Developing Countries, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2-3 (2007) (citing
WILSON, supra note 267, at 1.)
269. See Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1585-87
(1989) (arguing that a work's effect on the market should be taken into account when deciding whether a
copyright should be granted).
270. See COMM. ON DEV. AND INTELL. PROP., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP) AND BRAIN DRAIN,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., (CDIP) CDIP/7/4 Annex (May 2-6, 2011), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_7/cdip_7_4.pdf.
Quite conceivably, there is a relationship between IP and the brain drain phenomenon, with
two-way causality. IP protection may affect the decisions of scientists, engineers,
information technology specialists and related professionals about where to exercise their
profession, with consequences for a country's innovative capacity and the availability of
knowledge. Vice-versa, outward migration of skilled workers can impact on the
effectiveness of the IP system in reaching its goals of promoting innovation and technology
transfer.
271. See Hodapp, supra note 251.
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is in desperate need of more entrepreneurs, inventors, scientists and other
professionals, a complaint regularly made by non-Wall Street business
leaders and members of both major political parties." '272
The two brain drain influences illustrate the market explanation for high
author incentives. 273  First, the start-up costs for creative innovators
reflected in higher education costs and potentially lower earnings requires a
larger back-end reward for the risk and the delay associated with years of
education and, in many arts and science industries, years of
apprenticeship.274
Second, there is competition for the same creative innovators.2 75  U.S.
creative and research industries compete with the same industries overseas,
and they compete for talent with other economic sectors.276 Keeping the top
talent working in these fields requires providing market incentives for
choice of location and industry.277 Strong copyright protections for their
output places the risk of overpaying for these rights on the shoulders of the
innovators rather than creating ex-ante costs on educational institutions,
272. Amanda Terkel, America's 'Brain Drain': Best and Brightest College Grads Head for Wall
Street, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/15/brain-drain-
college-grads-wall-street_n_1069424.html; see also Hodapp, supra note 251 ("Stop the Brain Drain...
criticizes the 'monopoly' that Wall Street holds on top young talent, arising from large donations to
college career centers to obtain preferred access to recruitment. Instead of Wall Street, Stop The Brain
Drain promotes careers as entrepreneurs, scientists, and public servants.").
273. See JAMES L. W. WEST 111, AMERICAN AUTHORS AND THE LITERARY MARKETPLACE SINCE
1900 20 (1988); WADHWA, supra note 251.
274. See generally FOSTERING FLEXIBILITY IN THE ENGINEERING WORK FORCE, NAT'L ACAD.
PRESS, COMM. ON SKILL TRANSFERABILITY IN ENGINEERING LABOR MARKETS 55-59 (1990) ("Industry
recruiters ... emphasize tuition-reimbursed degree programs as a benefit of employment. The high cost
of a graduate education and the lack of enough funding to support large numbers of graduate students in
research associate positions makes these company-sponsored degree programs very attractive to B.S.
graduates."); SALLY O'REILLY, HOW TO BE A WRITER 4 (2011) ("Traditionally, most writers have
earned relatively little for their work, and authors who earn vast sums have always been the exception,
not the rule. Indeed, one reason that writing has remained a middle-class occupation is that it has paid
very poorly."); WEST, supra note 273, at 20.
275. See WADHWA, supra note 251.
276. See generally id.
277. See Deidr6 A. Keller, Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right: A Case
Comparison and Proposal, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 511,542-43 (2012) (explaining that one theoretical
purpose of copyright law is to benefit the greater market within which it is located).
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government or research facilities.2 7 8 Copyright rewards work much like an
athlete's reward system.
27 9
The margin at which incentives operate is in nudging potential
creators toward a life of creativity, rather than in eliciting
investment in any particular novel or symphony. The length and
breadth of the intellectual property right, together with the fair uses
that are granted, determine how profitable these creations are, and
influence how many people become creators of copyrighted
works.280
There may very well be an optimal societal investment in culture after
which there is less economic return,281 but that simply does not account for
the variation among the works, the value to society of a creative, inquisitive
professional culture, or the opportunities such professionals make for the
next generation of potential creative innovators who have mentors able to
enlighten, encourage, and modulate the challenges so that new entrants are
pulled along a creative path.282 Optimal is not that important.
The economic question is whether the works taken as a whole outweigh
the societal costs to foster them.283 Generations of economic growth and a
flourishing information age suggest the answer to this unknowable calculus
must be yes. The economic costs for this promotion are also quite high.
2 84
A recent empirical study suggests that authors value their own work
significantly higher than any rational economic model would suggest.
285
Professors Christopher Jon Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco, and Zachary
Burns have conducted empirical studies illustrating how authors value their
278. See id.
Understanding why copyright is protected is necessary to understand the appropriate
parameters of copyright protection. The reasons for protecting copyright are multifaceted and
nuanced .... In addition to utilitarianism and personhood theory, the theory that copyright
serves to reward authors for their labor is still occasionally referenced by courts.
Id.
279. Cf SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 98 (2004) (describing incentives as
leading to life of creativity rather than the creation of one work. In athletics the prospect of success




283. See Feder, supra note 228, at 861 (arguing a balancing test must be used to determine
whether file sharing takes away the incentive to create music).
284. See Sprigman, supra note 215, at 1424.
285. Id.
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works.286 They describe this overvaluation as the "creativity effect," which
they distinguish from an overvaluation related to pride in ownership by non-
creative owners. 287 "Authorship, our study suggests, produces a tendency to
value creativity more highly than does mere ownership." 288  Whether
optimal or not, professional authors value their works quite highly, so the
value of incentives must be high enough to influence their behavior. 289 It
may be less than economically efficient from a pure utilitarian standpoint,
but it reflects the behavioral psychology of the market.2 9° Strong incentives
to inculcate professional authors, however, do not necessarily come at the
cost of other benefits of copyright.291 One natural consequence of copyright
incentives for professional authors is a congruent view of fair use that
highly values teaching, scholarship, and research.292 While section 107
expressly states this, the underlying incentive structure reinforces it
further.293 Outside of works designed for sale specifically in the educational
marketplace, proper balancing of strong incentives should weigh heavily in
favor of fair use for these purposes. 294 A strong pro-education fair use bias
should counterbalance whatever concerns strong pro-professional author
bias raises regarding this balancing's non-utilitarian, inefficient, and
unapologetic emphasis promoting the creative economy.
VI. To ENCOURAGE MOTIVATION
The second explicit purpose of copyright is to encourage authorship as a
surrogate to enhance the public good. 95 While efficiency and utilitarianism
scholarship suggest that copyright should be limited, modem scholarship on
motivation may shed light on how best to shape copyright to encourage
296authorship. Moreover, to the extent copyright policies refine the scope of
286. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 31, 31-32 (2011) [hereinafter Creativity Effect]; Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman,
Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2010) [hereinafter Valuing
1P]; Sprigman, supra note 215, at 1434-35.
287. Creativity Effect, supra note 286, at 40 ("When internally motivated and engaged in
considerable creative effort, creators seem to value their works substantially more than do potential
buyers or mere owners.").
288. Sprigman, supra note 215, at 1397.
289. See id. at 1424.
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 256, at 2580-81.
292. See Lacey, supra note 269, at 1585-88 (comparing fair use and externalities)
293. Samuelson, supra note 256, at 2580.
294. SCOTCHMER, supra note 279, at 98.
295. Keller, supra note 277, at 542-43.
296. See EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1985).
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copyright to promote motivational efforts, those efforts should lead to a
more efficient copyright strategy.29 7
The cognitive psychological theories focusing on motivation for
creative works are creatures of the twentieth century.29 8 Sigmund Freud
focused primarily on motivational drives of sexuality and aggression with
little account for creativity. 299 Hull formalized drive theory as an approach
to psychology, viewing the person as a machine in need of equilibrium.
°°
Whether driven by Freud's motivations or Hull's more mechanistic drives,
however, these early approaches did not account for intrinsic motivations.
3 1
Psychologists began to understand something that authors and artists
had long expressed-the intrinsic motivation to create.30 2 These theories
attempted to explain "activities such as novelty and fantasy and biological
mechanisms such as play instincts, curiosity, and need for stimulation.,
30 3
In 1959, Robert White proposed a new explanation of motivation which
"could account for play, exploration, and a variety of other behaviors that
do not require reinforcements for their maintenance . "'04 White
identified his approach as "effectance motivation.3 °5 He "proposed a need
for effectance as a basic motivational propensity that energizes a wide range
of non-drive-based behaviors. 30 6  Effectance motivation captured the
"inherent satisfaction in exercising and extending one's capabilities."
30 7
While these theories did not explicitly extend from curiosity, play, and
creative drives to more formal drives of authorship and artistry, they
strongly suggest the connection. 30 8 The relationship is explicitly part of the
297. See id.
298. See DON H. HOCKENBURY & SANDRA E. HOCKENBURY, PSYCHOLOGY 336 (5th ed. 2008).
299. See FRED PINE, DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PROCESS 56-57 (1985) ("The first
wave, drive psychology, was initiated by Freud's . . .articulation of the theory of infantile sexuality
(1905) and led to the early mushrooming of writing on drives, their manifold transformations, and their
role in psychopathology."); See generally WAYNE WEITEN, PSYCHOLOGY: THEMES AND VARIATIONS
396-97 (8th ed. 2010).
300. METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 90-95 (David E. Leary ed. 1992).
301. See Avi Kaplan, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, EDUCATION.COM (July 20, 2010),
http://www.education.com/reference/article/intrinsic-and-extrinsic-motivation/ ("[D]uring the middle of
the 20th century, several theorists challenged the mechanistic models of the drive and behaviorist
perspectives. These theorists relied on observations indicating that sometimes people (and animals)
engage in behavior without an apparent reward.").
302. See id.
303. Id.
304. DECI & RYAN, supra note 296, at 5.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 27.
308. See generally CHARLES ELLIOT PEARLMAN, THE RELATIONSHIP OF EFFECTANCE
MOTIVATION TO CREATIVITY AND THE EFFECTS OF A PENALTY/REWARD VERSUS No PENALTY/REWARD
SITUATION ON THE DEMONSTRATION OF EFFECTANCE MOTIVATION 5 (1979); see also Paul Tough, How
CHILDREN SUCCEED: GRIT, CURIOSITY, AND THE HIDDEN POWER OF CHARACTER 64 (2012) (discussing
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Aristotelian understanding of human development. 30 9  According to this
view, "[e]ndowed with an innate striving to exercise and elaborate their
interests, individuals tend naturally to seek challenges, to discover new
perspectives, and to actively internalize and transform cultural practices."
310
The Aristotelian view actually fits neatly with the utilitarian view of
copyright, where it bases motivation on self-actualization rather than any
economic encouragement to create.311 Under this approach, copyright
operates as an external motivation, and therefore is unnecessary for
Aristotelian internal motivation and self-expression.312  The field of
psychology, however, "is quite widely divided on the issues of inherent
tendencies toward psychological growth, a unified self, and autonomous,
responsible behavior.,
313
Those theories on internal motivation, however, are insufficient to
explain perseverance.314 Among the limits on the Aristotelian model are the
barriers to success which include rejection, hard work, the need for
specialized training, and other limits an individual must overcome to
achieve self-actualization. 31 5 Efforts that are too simple fail to motivate, but
neither do goals that prove too hard.316
To help contextualize this tension regarding the limits of motivation,
self-determination theory provides a model that marries the necessary
internal motivation of the creative individual with the external resources and
rewards that enable success.3 17  Self-determination theory establishes a
distinction between the autonomous and controlled motivations that affect
components of motivation to achieve and volition or willpower and self-control as both being essential
requirements).
309. EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, HANDBOOK OF SELF DETERMINATION RESEARCH 3
(2004) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
310. Id. at 3 ("By stretching their capacities and expressing their talents and propensities, people




314. See, e.g., JORGEN SCHMIDHUBER, FORMAL THEORY OF CREATIVITY, FUN, AND INTRINSIC
MOTIVATION (1990-2010), 2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTONOMOUS MENTAL DEV. 230-31 (2010)
("The growing infant quickly gets bored by things it already understands well, but also by those it does
not understand at all, always searching for new effects exhibiting some yet unexplained but easily
learnable regularity. It acquires more and more complex behaviors building on previously acquired,
simpler behaviors."); TOUGH, supra note 309, at 105-07 (discussing the need to train students on
perseverance and resilience).
315. See, e.g., SCHMIDHUBER, supra note 314, at 230.
316. Jdat231.
317. Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, Self-Determination Theory. A Macrotheory of Human
Motivation, Development, and Health, 49 CANADIAN PSYCHOL.182, 182-85 (2008) [hereinafter Self-
Determination Theory].
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individual's behavior, and help explain why some rewards are
counterproductive.31 8
Autonomous motivation comprises both intrinsic motivation and the
types of extrinsic motivation in which people have identified with an
activity's value and ideally will have integrated it into their sense of
self. When people are autonomously motivated, they experience
volition, or a self-endorsement of their actions. Controlled
motivation, in contrast, consists of both external regulation, in which
one's behavior is a function of external contingencies of reward or
punishment, and introjected regulation, in which the regulation of
action has been partially internalized and is energized by factors
such as an approval motive, avoidance of shame, contingent self-
esteem, and ego-involvements. When people are controlled, they
experience pressure to think, feel, or behave in particular ways.
Both autonomous and controlled motivation energize and direct
behavior, and they stand in contrast to a motivation, which refers to
a lack of intention and motivation.
319
The essence of self-determination theory provides that the correct form
of external motivations will enhance one's internal motivation, creating a
positive feedback loop whereby the individual improves and internalizes the
external motivations, increasing capacity for new creativity, etc. 320 It belies
the Samuel Johnson quip "'[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote except for
money ' ' 321 because Johnson knew the difference between laborious works
and those dashed off. Johnson's view of writers was qualified by his
thought "[w]hat is written without effort is in general read without
pleasure." 322  Thomas Alva Edison said much the same thing when he
remarked "'[g]enius is one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent
perspiration.' 323 Accordingly, a 'genius' is often merely a talented person
who has done all of his or her homework.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 182 (emphasis in original).
320. Id.
321. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 55 (Charles Grosvenor Osgood ed., Project
Gutenberg 2006) (1791) (Boswell adds: "[n]umerous instances to refute this will occur to all who are
versed in the history of literature.").
322. Suzanne E. Rowe, The Difficulties of Writing Painful Prose, 71 OR. ST. B. BULL. 11, 11-12
(2011).
323. Thomas Alva Edison, quoted in JEFFREY WEBER, 1.D.E.A. To EXIT: AN ENTREPRENEURIAL
JOURNEY 56 (2010). The source of original quote not clear. -See Martin Andr6 Rosanoff, Edison in His
Laboratory, HARPER'S MONTHLY 402, 406 (1932).
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As with the role of copyright policy encouraging professional authors
and artists, self-determination theory and related theories324 balance internal
and external motivational theories, and emphasize the need to reward
authors in a manner consistent with their personal behavioral views.325 The
incentive structure of copyright provides the full bundle of exclusive rights
as the external reward.326
Authors may choose to select the copyright regime, adjusting their
behavior by fixing their works in a tangible form, registering the copyright
of published works,32 7 and affixing copyright notice.32 8 Or authors may
choose a different path, posting their works on content-sharing websites,
writing content for open access communities such as open source software,
creative commons publishing, freely distributed music, YouTube videos,
community theatre, freely distributable academic scholarship, or a myriad of
other choices.329 Millions of authors vote with their feet, demonstrating that
economic reward is not required, certainly not all the time.33°
The economic realities for each work created, along with the self-
determination theory factors, explain the choice made by authors to opt into
copyright's economic system or to opt into an alternative distribution
324. See Mihily Csikszentmihilyi, The Flow Experience and its Significance for Human
Psychology, in OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF FLOW IN CONSCIOUSNESS 25-30
(Mihily CsikszentmihAilyi & Isabella Selega Csikszentmihilyi eds. 1988) (discussing a variety of
theories and emphasizing Flow theory. "The universal precondition for flow is that a person should
perceive that there is something for him or her to do, and that he or she is capable of doing it").
325. Self Determination Theory, supra note 317, at 182.
326. Id. at 183.
327. Registration is not a requirement for copyright protection, however, only for standing for a
U.S. author to bring suit. See 107 U.S.C. §§ 408, 411 (2012).
328. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 408(c)(3), 411(a).
329. See, e.g., Maria LillM Montagnani, A New Interface Between Copyright Law and Technology:
How User-Generated Content Will Shape the Future of Online Distribution, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 719, 762 (2009) ("[A] characteristic feature of the market for online distribution is the simultaneous
coexistence of different systems of distribution ... within which it is difficult to draw a line between
proprietary and open distribution .... "); Laura N. Gasaway, The New Access Right and its Impact on
Libraries and Library Users, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 269, 304-05 (2003) ("The idea is to establish some
alternative approaches to licensing that will produce income for the copyright holder but will encourage
contributions to the public domain. The assumption is that there are many creators who will welcome
the exposure and benefits they will gain .. "); Jon M. Garon, What If DRM Fails?: Seeking Patronage
in the Iwasteland and the Virtual 0, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 103, 148 (2008) (discussing whether "the
wooden stage has given way to a limitless arena, bounded only by the flights of fancy imagined by the
programmers, illustrators, and participants in the online world. Can these worlds also sustain a
professional class of participants ... ?").
330. See Edward.Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1517
(2008) ("[M]ost major content owners today want to see fans fully engage with their favorite content and
are working hard to provide legitimate ways to do that."); Jon M. Garon, Wiki Authorship, Social Media,
and the Curatorial Audience, 1 HARV J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 95, 97-99 (2010) [hereinafter Wiki
Authorship].
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system331 If Jeremy Bentham is correct, then these choices reflect the utility
of copyright and the utility of the alternatives. 332 Rather than focus on
efficiency within copyright, the foundational economic questions should
focus on copyright as one of many possible idea generation and
dissemination regimes.333 The market can determine which such regime
best creates new ideas for the benefit of the public.
334
VII. A POSSIBLE CONSENSUS ON ATTRIBUTION AND OTHER COPYRIGHT
REFORMS
While this may be economic, workplace studies suggest that
noneconomic rewards may have strong behavioral incentives.335 Positive
peer reviews, control of one's work, attribution, and other non-economic
rewards provide the stimulus needed for continued efforts as an author.336
Non-economic rewards fit nicely into open source software movements,
wiki authorship projects, and free licenses that academic authors give of
their works.337 In all these cases, the reward comes from attribution and
peer recognition. 338  These reinforcements are precisely the "approval
motive, avoidance of shame, contingent self-esteem, and ego-
involvements 3 39  anticipated by the external, controlled motivation
underlying self-determination theory.340
The most obvious of these noneconomic rights are the moral rights
available to authors outside the United States, 34 1 and to authors of certain
works of visual arts within the United States.342 Outside of visual works,
331. See Montagnani, supra note 329, at 771 (explaining economic incentives with alternate
models).
332. See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior, 90
AM. ECON. REV. 426, 426 (2000).
333. See Montagnani, supra note 329, at 771 (explaining economic incentives with alternate
models).
334. See id. at 755.
335. See Susanne Neckermann et al., What is an Award Worth? An Econometric Assessment of the
Impact of Awards on Employee Performance (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2657, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1407003.
336. See Neckermann, supra note 335, at 3.
337. Id. (discussing the publicity authors obtain through free licensing).
338. Id.
339. Self-Determination Theory, supra note 317, at 182.
340. See Wiki Authorship, supra note 330, at 124-25 ("[T]he attribution information provides
similar rules of engagement for the page editors and curators-a form of engagement that is not provided
to the casual users of the wikis.").
341. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6 bs, July 24, 1971,
25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 235 [hereinafter Berne].
342. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) ("[T]he author of a work of visual art- (1) shall have the
right- (A) to claim authorship of that work, and (B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author
of any work of visual art which he or she did not create.").
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contract law and industry norms generally provide the context for protection
of an author's right of attribution. 343  "Attribution is foundational to the
modem economy .... Credit is instrumentally beneficial in establishing a
reputation and intrinsically valuable simply for the pleasure of being
acknowledged. Indeed, credit is itself a form of human capital."3 "
Broadening rights of attribution fit squarely within the self-
determination theory of copyright because the noneconomic control of an
author's name may be the primary motivation involved in copyright
contracting.345 It is possible that granting attribution rights would be
sufficient for many authors, enabling them to relinquish other exclusive
rights, if a form other than a positive license could protect the rights.340
Authors' ability to protect rights of attribution outside of contract law
has worsened considerably since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.34 7  In Dastar, the Supreme
Court used copyright to preempt trademark law and the unlimited rights of
publishers to exploit materials in the public domain to all works, whether
protected by copyright or not.348 The Court started with an accurate
explanation of the public domain.349  "The right to copy, and to copy
without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like 'the right to make [an
article whose patent has expired]-including the right to make it in
precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public.'" 350 The
Court also made clear that trademark law could not be used to limit the
public domain or to require attribution for public domain works
351
Unfortunately, the decision took an additional step, excluding trademark
protection for copyrighted works more generally.352
343. Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J.
49, 51 (2006).
344. Id. at 50.
345. See Wiki Authorship, supra note 330, at 108 (discussing an attribution default norm in the
creative commons license beginning in 2004). As the creative commons website explained, "[o]ur web
stats indicate that 97-98% of you choose Attribution, so we decided to drop Attribution as a choice from
our license menu - it's now standard." Glenn Otis Brown, Announcing (and Explaining) Our New 2.0
Licenses, COMMONS NEWS (May 25, 2004), http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/4216.
346. Wili Authorship, supra note 330, at 108-09.
347. See generally Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003).
348. Id. at 34.
349. See id at 25-26 (providing a factual background of the case and how copyright law
influences the public domain).
350. Id. at 33 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964)).
351. Id. at 33-34 ("[Olnce the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the
invention or work at will and without attribution. Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been
'careful to caution against misuse or over-extension' of trademark and related protections into areas
traditionally occupied by patent or copyright." (quoting Trafix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,
532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001))).
352. SeeDastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
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In sum, reading the phrase "origin of goods" in the Lanham Act in
accordance with the [Trademark] Act's common-law foundations
(which were not designed to protect originality or creativity), and in
light of the copyright and patent laws (which were), we conclude
that the phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are
offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or
communication embodied in those goods.353
There was no need to reach beyond public domain works to reach the rights
of an author to claim she was the "origin of the goods" embodied in
communicative works protected by copyright.354 Nonetheless, decisions
following Dastar have not focused on the facts of the decision but rather the
sweeping rhetoric, which suggests that trademark rights are unavailable to
authors.355
The decision to remove trademark protection from authors causes an
international concern, as well. 356  The U.S. admission into the Berne
Convention relied, at least in part, on the patchwork of non-copyright
protections available to authors 357 to protect rights of attribution and
integrity required under Article 6bis of the treaty.358 To eliminate the ability
to protect from unauthorized third party non-attribution or misattribution is
inconsistent with both U.S. treaty obligations 359 and self-determination
theory.36°
353. See id.
354. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and
Trademarks Law, 41 HOuS. L. REV. 263, 268 (2004).
355. See, e.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
("[T]he Supreme Court's holding did not depend on whether the works were copyrighted or not ....
Rather... the Court noted that protection for communicative products was available through copyright
claims.").
356. Viet Nam or Bust: Why Trademark Pirates are Leaving for Better Opportunities in Viet Nam,
14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 291, 293 (1996).
357. WILLIAM STRAUSS, THE MORAL RIGHT OF THE AUTHOR 115 (1959), reprinted in 2 STUDIES
ON COPYRIGHT 963, 965-76 (Arthur Fisher ed. 1963).
358. Berne, supra note 342, at 235. See also Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing
the Dastar "Gap ", 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 714 (2007).
359. Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1803-
04 (2012) (calling for statutory changes to add a right of attribution); Greg Lastowka, Digital
Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41, 84-85 (2007); Laura A. Heymann,
The Birth of Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1377, 1445-46 (2005); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in
the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 988 (2002).
360. See, e.g., Deci & Ryan, supra note 309, at 3 (providing why it will likely be more difficult to
be one's "self' of third party intruders without authorization are prevalent).
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Moreover, there is little utilitarian value in misinformation, so the duty
to provide proper attribution comes at little expense. 361 For example, "[t]he
United Kingdom provides authors of certain copyrightable works with a
waivable right to be named as the author of their works in a clear and
reasonably prominent manner., 362 A non-utilitarian cost may arise if the
right of attribution were neither waivable nor assignable.
363
Publication likely has a disproportionate benefit for professional
creators.364 A recent empirical study trying to determine the economic
value of publication and attribution suggests that while all authors overvalue
their works, attribution will not interfere with the valuation.365 There is
some empirical support for even the utilitarian value of attribution rights.
366
Much stronger, however, is the evidence of the value placed on attribution
rights, particularly the value professionals place on them. 367  Attribution,
therefore, clearly benefits both the desire to promote professional authors as
a goal for promoting higher quality works, and, as a strong controlled
motivation, enhances interjected regulation that marries the intrinsic goal
for authors with the global default norms for authors.368
An economic consideration that may help alleviate concerns about over-
enforcement and other transaction costs arising from default rights of
attribution could be the adoption of an express standard for de minimis non
curat lex.369 "[D]e minimis can mean that copying has occurred to such a
trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative threshold of substantial
similarity, which is always a required element of actionable copying., 370 Of
course, no copyright claim exists if there is nothing protected by copyright,
so the de minimis threshold goes to the trivial amount copied.37'
In Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Azrak-Hamway International, Inc.,372 the
Second Circuit applied the de minimis doctrine to dismiss a case of a
photograph of the copyright holder's product incorporated into a display
361. See, e.g., Sprigman et. al., supra note 215, at 1402 (citing Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 77-78 (U.K.)).
362. Id.
363. Cf id. at 1402.
364. Seeid. at l411
365. See id.
366. See Sprigman et al., supra note 215, at 1427 ("For those scholars who promote attribution
rights from a utilitarian perspective, the significant positive value that creators attach to attribution may
seem to support provision of such rights.").
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. Ringgold v. Black Ent. TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) ("'[T]he law does not
concern itself with trifles."').
370. Id. See also Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998).
371. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74.
372. Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 668 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1982).
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card, since the display card was not used.373 Knickerbocker involved
significant copying and public display. 374 The consequence of the copying
proved de minimis.375  Today, that discussion would likely warrant a
complex fair use analysis to get to the same result.
376
Particularly in the area of expanded rights of attribution, de minimis
failures to attribute should not result in judgments.377 Copyright law can set
the appropriate normative rule, but like other loose aspects of copyright,




At the heart of the copyright debate remains a fundamental
disagreement over whether an exclusive right provides authors a utilitarian
tool to incentivize authors or whether it represents societies' investment in
authors to keep them committed to producing the best works they can.379
Economic theories cannot overcome the reality that authors are not
economically rational.3 80 Authors believe the work they invest their time,
souls, and effort in can change the world.38' They prize it far more highly
than any statistical model.382 The works they create have fueled the creative
economy and the information age.383
Rather than seeking an optimal economic ideal that risks economically
undermining this growth, use of self-determination theory can aid copyright
policy makers to focus on those attributes of copyright that promote the
well-recognized internal drives to create and focus the external incentives
on those that promote professional authorship.384 Since those works which
most effectively develop critical new ideas and those works that best
influence the aesthetics of their age stand as the most beneficial to the
373. Id.
374. Id. The public display included putting the product in question in catalogues.
375. Id. at 702-03. The product in question actually had significantly different characteristics than
the product it was allegedly copied from.
376. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 358, at 703.
377. Id.
378. Accord Garon, supra note 150, at 1353 ("Rather than suggesting that the law should become
stronger to protect copyright, then, it seems more appropriate that the shapers of the law recognize the
dissonance between current law and society."); Information as Property, supra note 226, at 369
(discussing nature of leaky copyright).
379. See Sprigman et al., supra note 215, at 1427.




384. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 359, at 1754.
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public, the focus should be on the professional authors who can invest the
time and effort to hone their craft and build a powerful body of work.385
Nurturing professional authors and incentivizing the creative drive more
generally suggests a change to U.S. law to restore rights of attribution
through copyright and trademark doctrine so that the highly valued right to
credit or attribution can be protected through a mechanism other than
contract law.386
Along with recommendations that this understanding of copyright
should dictate broader attribution rights, it also suggests strong support for a
broad understanding of fair use.387 Particularly as applied to education,
comment, and criticism, fair use enables copyright policy to nurture and
support the creative incentive and help inculcate the creative professional
class.388 Similarly, to ensure that copyright enforcement does not get in the
way of copyright's purpose, the doctrine of de minimis should be
recognized more broadly.389
This approach fits nicely within the modem science of psychology, as
well as the founding understanding of copyright.390 From the time of the
American Revolution, copyright was understood to achieve twin purposes
of encouraging the innate creativity within our new nation and promoting a
professional cadre of authors who would share the light the lamps of
knowledge throughout the world. 9 This goal has not changed.392 The
lamp remains brighter than ever.
385. See id. at 1762.
386. Seeid at 1805.
387. Seeid at 1819.
388. See id.
389. See, e.g., Knickerbocker, 668 F.2d at 702-03. The product in question actually had
significantly different characteristics than the product it was allegedly copied from, and; therefore, the
Knickerbocker Court correctly applied the de minimis standard.
390. See Hughes, supra note 358, at 662 (explaining that various copyright views refer to
economic incentives and moral rights).
391. See id.
392. See Fromer, supra note 359, at 1777.
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